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Secure Multimedia Authoring with Dishonest Collaborators∗
Nicholas Paul Sheppard† Reihaneh Safavi-Naini‡ Philip Ogunbona§
Abstract
Many systems have been proposed for protecting the
intellectual property of multimedia authors and owners
from the public at large, who have access to the multime-
dia only after it is published. In this paper, we consider the
problem of protecting authors’ intellectual property rights
from insiders, such as collaborating authors and produc-
ers, who interact with the creative process before publi-
cation. We describe the weaknesses of standard proof-of-
ownership watermarking approaches against dishonest in-
siders, and propose several possible architectures for sys-
tems that avoid these weaknesses. We further show how
these architectures can be adapted for fingerprinting in the
presence of dishonest insiders.
Keywords. digital watermarking, collaboration, multi-
ple watermarking, proof of ownership, fingerprinting
1 Introduction
Multimedia security research has focused upon security
of published content, and upon protecting the intellectual
property of the content owners and creators from mali-
cious end users. These systems, however, do nothing to
resolve intellectual property disputes that arise prior to
publication, for example, between collaborating authors.
We will consider intellectual property protection in the
case where the disputing parties are (or claim to be) in-
volved in the creation stage of the content in dispute. We
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will specifically consider proof-of-ownership, that is, en-
abling authors to prove to an arbiter that they were in-
volved in the authoring process. We will also consider
how our architectures can be adapted to fingerprinting,
that is, enabling authors to determine the identity of an
author who has “leaked” a copy of the work without per-
mission from the other authors.
Watermarking solutions to the above problems have
been proposed in the case where the adversary has ac-
cess only to the published work, i.e. is an outsider. In
Section 2, we will describe the weaknesses in these so-
lutions against an adversary who is part of the authoring
process — i.e. is an insider — who in a naı̈ve protocol
may be able to obtain a copy of the unwatermarked origi-
nal. While some previous algorithms have considered wa-
termarks for representing the collaborative effort of sev-
eral contributors [19, 8], protocols by which such wa-
termarked objects are created have not been extensively
studied.
In Section 3, we will describe several possible proto-
cols for multimedia authoring in the proof-of-ownership
setting that avoid the weaknesses in naı̈ve protocols by
preventing insiders from obtaining a copy of the unwater-
marked original. We will further show how these proto-
cols can be adapted for fingerprinting in Section 4.
2 Intellectual Property Protection
Using Watermarks
A digital watermark is a secret signal embedded into a
multimedia object that can only be detected or recovered
by someone possessing a secret key. Many techniques
for embedding watermarks in all manner of multimedia
objects have been proposed; a survey is given in [13].
In the watermarking solution to the proof-of-ownership
problem, the owner of a multimedia object embeds a wa-
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termark into the finished object prior to publication, and
publishes the watermarked object instead of the original
version. If, at a later time, an imposter claims to be
the originator of the published object, the true owner can
prove his or her ownership by demonstrating the existence
of the secret watermark to an arbiter.
This solution assumes that the adversary has access
only to the published version of the object. Existing wa-
termarking systems generally make an implicit assump-
tion that watermarking is more or less the final step before
publication, since they take a finalised object as input and
output the object to be published. Without an additional
protocol to govern access to the object prior to watermark-
ing and publication, an insider is able to take a copy of the
object without a watermark.
Clearly an adversary in possession of an unwater-
marked object can circumvent the protocol described
above, since this copy does not contain the legitimate
owners’ secret watermark. In this paper, we will dis-
cuss protocols for authoring multimedia such that no party
gains access to an unwatermarked version of the content,
thus preserving the integrity of the protocol described
above even in the presence of dishonest insiders.
Of course, any attack on a watermarking system that is
available to outsiders is also available to insiders. In this
paper, however, we will only consider attacks by insiders
that are not available to outsiders. Our example water-
marks will be chosen for ease of exposition rather than
security against conventional outsider attacks.
2.1 Multiple Watermarking
We will use multiple watermarking to represent the intel-
lectual property rights of multiple contributors, i.e. each
contributor will have a personal watermark and the final
object will contain the collection of these personal water-
marks. An overview of schemes that allow multiple wa-
termarks to be embedded into a single object is given in
[19].
We distinguish three classes of multiple watermark:
• a re-watermark created by watermarking the object
with several different watermarks in turn;
• a segmented watermark created by dividing the ob-
ject into pieces and embedding a different watermark
into each piece; and
• a composite watermark created by composing sev-
eral different watermarks into a single watermark
(i.e. the composition is a kind of shared secret) and
embedding this composition.
Separability. For our purposes, we assume that all of
our multiple watermarks are separable, that is, that it is
possible to detect each component watermark individually
in the watermarked object.
Segmented watermarks are always separable, since
each segment (and therefore watermark) is tested inde-
pendently.
Watermarks produced by re-watermarking are usually
separable if the underyling algorithm is robust against
re-watermarking. For the applications discussed in this
paper, watermarks are required to be robust against re-
watermarking since otherwise an attacker can defeat the
proof-of-ownership protocol by simply re-watermarking
the object.
Composite watermarks may or may not be separable,
depending on the way composition is performed. For
the examples in this paper, composition is performed by
simple vector or matrix addition of independently chosen,
randomly distributed watermark patterns. A statistical de-
tector can separate the component watermarks since the
watermarking patterns are mutually uncorrelated. Some
more exotic methods of composition, such as those sug-
gested by Guo and Georganas [8] may require modified
detectors. The specifics of each of our examples will be
discussed in Section 3.
Capacity. Obviously there is a limit to the number
of watermarks that any multimedia object can contain.
Watermarks formed by composition or re-watermarking
gradually degrade the image as each new watermark is
added. In a segmented watermark, the number of water-
marks that can be embedded is limited by the number of
available segments.
In general, it seems reasonable to believe that the wa-
termarking capacity of an object would be commensurate
with the number of authors working on it. It does not
seem very likely, for example, that a still image would re-
quire more than two or three authors to produce. Larger
works that may require large teams of authors to produce,
such as feature films, have a much greater watermarking
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capacity.
2.2 Our Model
In our collaborative version of the proof-of-ownership
problem, our aim is to prevent a dishonest insider from
denying the contribution of other insiders. This is not
much different from the aim in the conventional proof-
of-ownership problem, except that the dishonest outsider
in this model is replaced by a dishonest insider here. In
both the conventional model and our one, an honest in-
sider desires to produce evidence that proves his or her
case against the dishonest party.
We define an insider as someone who has access to
the multimedia content before publication, such as an au-
thor. We will sometimes use the term “author” to mean an
actively contributing insider. Each insider is assumed to
have some secret information which he or she can use to
embed a secret watermark known only to that insider. We
will give some examples of how this secret information is
used in Section 3.
An outsider is anyone who is not an insider. We will not
explicitly consider protection from dishonest outsiders in
this paper. During the pre-publication phase, we assume
that the insiders have suitable private channels which can-
not be listened to or tampered with by outsiders. (By
the letter of the definition, an outsider who could do such
things would become an insider).
We are not aware of any method by which a computer
system can make artistic decisions about the contributions
of authors. We will therefore assume that
• all insiders are permitted to make arbitrary changes
to the object being authored, whatever their per-
ceived artistic value; and
• all insiders have an equal right to be represented as
the owners of the finished object, whatever a human
judge might think of their contribution.
It is possible to develop more complex systems that use
access control structures to constrain authors to chang-
ing only certain regions of the object; give different pre-
assigned weights to different authors’ watermarks; elimi-
nate insiders’ watermarks if that insider makes no contri-
bution; and so forth, but for simplicity we will not discuss
these straightforward extensions here.
Any insider is able to take a copy of the object being au-
thored at any time, and optionally make private changes
to it, possibly including “changes” made by ignoring the
contributions of other authors. An object created other
than by the legitimate publication procedure will be re-
ferred to as a rebel object. We will not attempt to pre-
vent authors from creating and publishing rebel objects,
since such activity is analogous to an outsider who takes
a copy of the published object and makes his or her own
changes to it, and this cannot be prevented in the general
watermarking model. We do, however, demand that rebel
objects contain the watermarks of all the contributors to
the object, so that the rebel insider cannot deny the other
insiders’ contribution to any object, whether it is a rebel
one or not.
3 Architectures for Secure Author-
ing
In this section, we will describe several possible architec-
tures for multimedia authoring systems that provide intel-
lectual property protection against dishonest insiders who
participate in the authoring process itself, avoiding the
vulnerability of the conventional approaches to dishonest
insiders described in Section 2. For ease of exposition,
we will describe only proof-of-ownership watermarking
in this section. We will show how to adapt the construc-
tions here for fingerprinting in Section 4.
As in the conventional proof-of-ownership case, we
cannot appeal to encryption for protection against dishon-
est parties since all parties must have access to the unen-
crypted object if they are to make any use of it. Water-
marking aims to solve this problem by embedding sub-
liminal information into an unencrypted object that deters
illegitimate use by threatening an illegitimate user with
detection.
Our general approach is to maintain a version of
the work-in-progress that contains a “watermark-in-
progress”. Changes to the work-in-progress result in cor-
responding changes to the watermark. The authors, there-
fore, do not have an opportunity to obtain an unwater-
marked version of the object, but are still able to access
a usable version of the object. An author making some
illegitimate use of the object can then be dealt with in the
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same way as in the conventional case.
Of course, any form of collaborative authoring sys-
tem requires some form of concurrency control to prevent
mishaps due to two or more authors trying to edit the same
thing at the same time. This is a well-known problem with
well-known solutions in concurrent programming, and for
simplicity we will not explicitly mention them here.
3.1 Authoring with a Trusted Repository
If the authors have access to a repository which they all
trust with their watermark information and the unwater-
marked original, it is relatively straightforward to imple-
ment a solution to our problem, using an architecture sim-
ilar to the IETF’s WebDAV protocol [7].
Whenever an author wishes to make a change to the
object, the repository makes a watermarked version (con-
taining the watermarks of all authors) of its master copy,
and transmits this to the editing author. The editing author
transmits the changes back to the repository, which incor-
porates them into its unwatermarked original. In a naı̈ve
implementation, the master copy may become degraded
due to the repeated addition of watermarks every time the
object is checked out; however, we will give an example
of how this can be avoided in Section 3.2.2.
3.2 Authoring with a Blind Repository
By embedding the watermark in an encrypted domain, it
is possible to implement a system in which
• no party, including the server, has access to the un-
watermarked original X ;
• the watermark wi is known only to author i; and
• all the authors have access to the watermarked object
X̂ containing all of the authors’ watermarks.
Some techniques for embedding watermarks in encrypted
domains are described by Fridrich, et al. [6, 5], Yen
[22] and Memon and Wong [14]. Memon and Wong’s
construction, based on a privacy homomorphism [18] be-
tween the encryption and watermarking functions, is the
most convenient for our purposes.
An encryption function E(X, k) is a privacy homomor-
phism with respect to a function f(X, Y ) if and only if
E(f(X, Y ), k) = f(E(X, k), E(Y, k)),
for all plaintexts X and Y , and keys k. For example, RSA
[17] is a privacy homomorphism with respect to fixed
point multiplication.
Let each author i have a secret watermark wi, and let
k be a global encryption key known to the authors (and
no one else, including the server). Let W (X, w) denote
watermarking an object X with a watermark w and let
g(X, δX) be a function that applies the changes δX to X .
We require that g(X, δX) be invertible, that is, given an
object X and another object X ′, it is possible to compute
δX such that
X ′ = g(X, δX).
Let E(X, k) be an encryption function that is a pri-
vacy homomorphism with respect to both W (X, w) and
g(X, δX).
To initialise the server, each author transmits E(wi, k)
to the server using a private secure channel, and the server
records the encrypted watermarks for future use. The
server’s master copy of the encrypted object can be ini-
tialised by having an author choosing a random object X
and transmitting E(X, k) to the server. Alternatively, if
the encryption function is such that the server can ran-
domly generate a valid ciphertext without knowing the
key, it is possible for the server to simply choose its own
random “encrypted” object E(X, k).
An author wishing to modify the object X makes a re-
quest to the server. Let W ∗(X, w1, . . . , wm) denote the
object X watermarked with each watermark w1 up to
wm in turn (by re-watermarking), where m is the num-
ber of authors. Note that composition rather than re-
watermarking is also possible if the encryption function is
a privacy homomorphism with respect to the composition
function; we will see an example of this in Section 3.2.2.
The server computes
W ∗(E(X, k), E(w1, k), . . . , E(wm, k))
and transmits this to the author that made the request.
Since E(X, k) is a privacy homomorphism with re-
spect to W (X, w), we can see that
W ∗(E(X, k), E(w1, k), . . . , E(wm, k)) = E(X̂, k)
by applying the homomorphic property m times. Hence,
the author receiving E(X̂, k) can decrypt the water-
marked object
X̂ = W ∗(X, w1, . . . , wm)
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and edit this object as normal to produce a new object
X̂ ′. The server, however, cannot decrypt the object since
it does not know the key k.
The author computes δX such that X̂ ′ = g(X̂, δX)
and transmits E(δX, k) to the server (in practice, the au-
thor may just create δX directly by storing the changes he
or she makes). The server computes
E(g(X, δX), k) = g(E(X, k), E(δX, k)) ≈ E(X ′, k)
and makes this its new master copy of the encrypted
object. Some care needs to be taken in the choice of
g(X, δX) to keep the approximation manageable. For a
well-chosen g(X, δX), the approximation can be elimi-
nated altogether, and we will give an example of such a
choice in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Limitations
Memon and Wong note that this system of embedding
watermarks in an encrypted domain prevents the water-
marking algorithm from using any perceptual information
about the object. An alternative approach that may avoid
this problem is the random transform domain technique
of Fridrich, et al. [6, 5], in which watermarking is per-
formed in a random frequency-like domain. Due to space
considerations, we will not explore this alternative further
in the present paper.
3.2.2 An Example
In their example of a homomorphic watermarker, Memon
and Wong use RSA encryption and the watermarking al-
gorithm of Cox, et al. [2]. However,
• using a non-oblivious watermarking method is in-
convenient in our situation where we have stated that
the original should be inaccessible (though a collu-
sion of the server and at least one author could reveal
it);
• asymmetric encryption such as RSA results in a
many-fold expansion in the size of the object when
used in the pointwise fashion required for the con-
struction to work;
• pointwise encryption is potentially vulnerable to at-
tacks because of the small number of possible plain-
texts; and
• applying changes in the transform domain is difficult
since human authors work in the spatial domain.
As we do not need asymmetric encryption for our situ-
ation, a more convenient choice for the encryption func-
tion is permutation in the spatial domain. Since permuta-
tion is homomorphic with respect to any pointwise func-
tion, we have great flexibility in choosing a watermarking
function. Let the watermark of author i be represented
by a matrix wi of the same size as the image to be water-
marked, and let watermarking be performed by matrix ad-
dition of the watermark to the image. Several simple wa-
termarking algorithms, such as the Patchwork algorithm
of Bender, et al. [1] and the algorithm of Pitas [16], can
be implemented this way.
A convenient choice for g(X, δX) is the function that
selectively replaces the elements of a p× q matrix X with
those from another p× q matrix δX to form a new matrix
X ′ with
X ′(x, y) =
{
X(x, y), if δX(x, y) = −1
δX(x, y), otherwise
.
An inverse for any X and X ′ using this function can be
derived from a simple pointwise comparison.
With this choice of g(X, δX), watermarked pixels ob-
tained from the server and unmodified by the author are
not returned to the server since they are at positions where
δX(x, y) = −1. The only pixels incorporated into the
server’s master (unwatermarked) copy are the unwater-
marked ones created by authors after modifying the im-
age.
Let κ be a permutation on the elements of a p×q matrix,
known only to the authors. Let wi be a p × q watermark-
ing pattern known only to author i. Let the object being
authored be X , and let the server have κ(X) and κ(wi)
for all authors i. The procedure for an author i to edit the
object is the same as before, except that it is possible to
use a composite watermark here:
1. The server computes a composed permuted water-




2. The server computes the permuted watermarked ob-
ject by κ(X̂) = κ(X) + κ(w∗) [= κ(X + w∗)], and
transmits κ(X̂) to author i.
3. Author i uses the inverse permutation to get X̂ =
κ−1(κ(X + w∗)) = X + w∗.
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4. Author i makes changes δX to X̂ , where δX is a
p × q matrix with entries of −1 where the pixel at
that position was unchanged, or the new pixel value
otherwise.
5. Author i transmits κ(δX) to the server.
6. The server computes its new master copy of the per-
muted original by κ(X ′) = g(κ(X), κ(δX)) [=
κ(g(X, δX))].
Using either the Patchwork or Pitas algorithms, the
composed watermark w∗ can be detected as usual by a
conventional detector since it is a valid watermark pattern
of itself. It is also possible for a conventional detector
to separate the individual watermarks w1, . . . , wm since
they are uncorrelated and composition in this fashion is
equivalent to re-watermarking in these systems.
3.2.3 An Attack
Given a watermarked object and its original version, an
attacker can attempt to estimate the watermark signal by
comparing the two. This leads to a variety of possible
attacks in which a dishonest author submits a specially-
constructed object to the server, immediately requests the
watermarked version, and uses the two versions to obtain
information about the other authors’ watermarks.
Suppose, for example, an author creates an object X
and submits this to the server. This X could be the initial
object given to the server during the initialisation phase,
or it could be created by checking out an existing object
and over-writing it before re-submission.
If the author immediately requests the object again, the
author will obtain the watermarked version
X̂ = W (X, w1, . . . , wm).
The author now knows both X and its watermarked ver-
sion, which may allow the author to compute the (com-
posed) watermark. For example, in the permutation ex-
ample above, the author can compute
X̂ − X = (X + w∗) − X
= w∗
Knowledge of w∗, in the example system, allows the
author to remove the watermark from any image water-
marked by the server by a simple matrix subtraction.
A simple-minded solution might be to disallow all-of-
object changes, but a patient author can still build up
knowledge of a collective watermark w∗ using a sequence
of changes that, when taken together, cover the object. Al-
ternatively, an author could be prohibited from accessing
the object twice in a row, but a determined author may
still be able to piece information together from points that
were not changed by intermediate authors.
To defeat this attack and other similar attacks based
on examining the output of the server for a specially-
constructed input, either
• it should not be feasible to compute w∗ given X and
W (X, w∗), or
• it should not be feasible to compute X given
W (X, w∗) and w∗.
Watermarking schemes that satisfy one or the other of
these conditions are proposed by Depovere and Kalker [3]
and Stern and Tillich [21]. In these schemes, a single
detection key σ can be used to generate many different
watermark patterns w∗ using a one-way function. Each
watermarked object is watermarked using the same σ but
a different w∗. This approach prevents an attacker from
learning any information about σ even if he or she can
learn w∗. Without knowledge of σ, an attacker cannot re-
move or otherwise tamper with watermarks created by the
server. Investigation of how these types of schemes can be
implemented in our architectures is a subject of on-going
research.
3.3 Authoring with Layers
In this section, we will consider an architecture for au-
thoring that does not require a server, trusted or otherwise.
Consider a function U(X1, . . . , Xm) that takes a collec-
tion of layers X1, . . . , Xm and merges them into a single
object X . A simple example is the function that over-
lays a collection of line-drawings on transparent back-
grounds, producing an object containing every line from
every drawing. For a suitable choice of U(X1, . . . , Xm),
we can arrange for an object X = U(X1, . . . , Xm) to be
manipulated by a collection of m authors who each make
changes to one layer only.
Let each author i own a layer and maintain two versions
of this layer: an unwatermarked layer X i, and a water-
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marked layer X̂ i = W (X i, wi) where W (X, w) denotes
watermarking an object X with a watermark w. The for-
mer is a secret of its author, and the latter is public. Of
course the author need not embed his or her watermark
in the public layer if he or she does not want to, making
the public layer the same as the “private” layer, but this
in no way affects the other authors’ watermarks. Anyone
knowing all of the public layers can compute an object
X̂ = U(X̂1, . . . , X̂m).
To make a change to the object, an author i first makes
the appropriate change to his or her private layer X i. He
or she then computes a new version of the public layer
X̂ i corresponding to the new private layer, and publishes
the new X̂ i. The other authors may then re-compute their
copy of the merged object.
A rebel author may choose to create a rebel object by
ignoring broadcasts from some particular author i. The
rebel object thus produced will not contain the watermark
wi, and therefore author i cannot claim any contribution
to the rebel object. This is unavoidable in this architec-
ture, and it is debatable as to whether or not author i
should be able to claim contribution to an object from
which his or her contribution has been erased. Eliminat-
ing one author, however, does not affect the ability of the
other authors to exhibit their watermarks in the rebel ob-
ject.
Of course, it is not automatic that the watermarks in
the X̂ is will survive the merging process for any arbitrary
combination of watermarking and merging functions. We
will give an example in which there is a statistical expec-
tation that the watermarks can be detected in the merged
object, but we do not know of any way of guaranteeing
this while still providing a useful merging function.
3.3.1 An Example
We will describe a layered watermarking system for raster
images, using the JAWS watermark of Kalker, et al.
[11], except that for simplicity of exposition we will
not use translation invariance. While this watermark’s
stated purpose is broadcast monitoring rather than proof-
of-ownership, it is a convenient example for our purposes.
For simplicity, we will assume that the images are grey-
scale though it is easy to extend the procedure to colour
images.
As described above, each author i maintains a private,
unwatermarked p × q image (layer) X i and a public, wa-
termarked p × q image X̂ i. These are both initialised to
zero. Each author i also has a private p × q watermark
pattern wi with standard normal distribution (i.e. each
element of wi is randomly chosen from a normal distribu-
tion with mean zero and standard deviation one), as usual
in JAWS.
Each author also maintains a copy of a p × q ma-
trix Y with entries from 1, . . . , m, which is initialised
randomly. To compute the merged, watermarked image
X̂ = U(X̂1, . . . , X̂m), every author can compute
X̂(x, y) = X̂Y (x,y).
The authors do not need to agree on an initial Y since
every author’s layer is identical in the beginning. Even
if the layers are not identical, choosing one is as good as
choosing the next.
If an author i wishes to make a change to a set of pixel
locations D, he or she makes the appropriate changes in
X i and computes X ′ = U(X̂1, . . . , X i, . . . , X̂m), i.e.
X ′(x, y) =
{
X i(x, y), if Y (x, y) = i
X̂Y (x,y)(x, y), otherwise
.











 ∗ X ′
where ‘∗’ denotes convolution, and computes the water-
marked values for all the pixel locations (x, y) ∈ D using
the usual JAWS embedding function
X̂ i(x, y) = X i(x, y) + αλ(x, y)wi(x, y)
where α is a global scaling parameter. The other pixels of
X̂ i are left unchanged.
The other authors are then informed of the change by
a broadcast of D by author i. Each author then updates
their copy of Y by setting
Y (x, y) = i for all (x, y) ∈ D,
leaving other entries in Y unchanged. Note that an author
can also choose a rebel Y , thus creating a rebel object, but
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this object still contains the other authors’ watermarks un-
less one author has been targeted for removal as described
in the introduction this section.
The resulting watermark is a kind of segmented water-
mark. If the watermark detector has access to Y , it can
partially invert the merging function to obtain a set of lay-
ers, each containing the pixels watermarked by a particu-
lar author (with zeros where the contents of that layer are
unknown).
Since the watermark patterns are mutually uncorre-
lated, however, it is possible for a detector to test for a
given watermark pattern without knowledge of Y , using
the normal JAWS detection algorithm. To test an image Z











and then compute the correlation of Z ′ with w. Even
though only some of the pixels of X̂ come from the layer
containing a watermark pattern wi, the correlation of X̂
with wi is still high, as





i(x, y)(X(x, y) +






i(x, y)X(x, y) +
∑
Y (x,y)=i αλ(x, y)(w
i(x, y))2 +
∑
Y (x,y)6=i αλ(x, y)w






since the expected correlation of wi with the original im-
age and the other watermarks is zero. This is the same
idea as used by the asymmetric watermark of Hartung and
Girod [10]; in fact, Eggers, et al. [4] suggest that Hartung
and Girod’s method might be more useful as a multiple
watermark than as an asymmetric one.
3.3.2 Limitations
This system does not guarantee that an author’s water-
mark will be detectable in the final object, since it is en-
tirely possible that an author’s contribution will be oblit-
erated by later authors over-writing that author’s contribu-
tion. Consider, for example, the case where some director
makes a rough sketch of a scene he or she wants drawn,
then other artists move in to fill out the details, obliter-
ating the sketch. No watermark can survive a complete
re-drawing of the image (whether or not the new image
is semantically related to the old one), so it is difficult to
see how any useful merging function could preserve wa-
termarks in such obliterated contributions.
3.4 Authoring with Instructions
A special case of the layered authoring system described
in the previous section is the case where the object is cre-
ated by authors who issue streams of instructions to make
changes to the object, such as “draw a line here”, “make
this pixel blue”, etc. The final object can be thought of
as the interleaving (“merging”) of the individual instruc-
tion streams (“layers”) of each author. The Network Text
Editor of Handley and Crowcroft [9], for example, uses
a similar architecture. Clearly, this model is well-suited
to formats that represent objects by a sequence of render-
ing primitives, such as text or vector graphics, rather than
formats that represent objects by raster data.
The system is initialised by each author creating an
empty object. Let each author i have a secret watermark
wi, and let X i = X i1, X
i
2, . . . denote the stream of in-
structions issued by author i.
To issue an instruction X ij to make a change to the ob-
ject, an author i computes a watermarked version of the
instruction X̂ ij = W (X
i
j , w
i), and broadcasts X̂ ij to all of
the authors, who append this to their local copy of the ob-
ject. The unwatermarked version X ij is discarded (though
there is no reason author i couldn’t keep it if he or she
wanted to).
As in the layered system, an author can choose to ig-
nore the broadcasts of other authors and create a rebel ob-
ject with an eliminated author. In this architecture, this
is equivalent to an outsider who crops instructions from
the final object, which is unavoidable in the general wa-
termarking model.
3.4.1 On Instruction Complexity
Depending on the complexity of the instructions used, it
may or may not be possible to embed an entire watermark
into a single instruction. Solachidis, et al., for example,
propose a watermark for polylines [20] that could be used
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to embed a whole watermark into an instruction to draw a
polyline or similar complex shape.
However, multimedia languages typically make use of
many much simpler instructions such as “put text here” or
“draw a line” that have only one or two points available
for embedding watermark information. In this case, the
watermark information needs to be distributed over many
instructions. Let the watermark pattern wi of a participant
i be made up of a sequence of n components wi1, . . . , w
i
n,
and let f(Xj , wil) be a function for embedding a water-
mark component wil into an instruction Xj . Let τ(·) be
some mapping of instructions to the integers 1, . . . , n.
Then an author i can embed a watermark component in
each instruction Xj by




A simple choice for τ(·) would be to number instruc-
tions according to the order in which they were issued,
i.e.
τ(Xj) = j mod n + 1.
However, this is a poor choice since the instructions may,
in general, be re-ordered without affecting the way the
object is rendered. A more robust choice is to determine
τ(Xj) by some property of Xj that cannot be changed so
easily, such as its position in the drawing space. We will
give an example of such a function in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.2 On the Output Format
The raw instruction streams issued by authors are unlikely
to make an attractive format for distribution. We can ex-
pect that the raw instruction streams will contain many
instructions that make corrections to earlier instructions.
Distributing such redundant instructions is not only ineffi-
cient, but may also be unimplementable on output devices
such as printers that cannot alter the effect of any instruc-
tions once they have been carried out.
We can therefore expect some degree of post-
processing on the instruction stream to put it into an ac-
ceptable format for distribution. This may mean removing
redundant instructions, or combining a series of correc-
tive instructions into a single instruction, or radical format
conversions such as rasterisation. It is inevitable that wa-
termark information will be lost in the process, and possi-
bly whole contributions obliterated as in the layered case.
A radical format conversion may destroy the watermark
completely; this is true of any watermark, not just ones
created by instruction streams.
3.4.3 An Example
We will describe a system for authoring two-dimensional
vector graphics where authors may draw lines, circles,
polygons, etc.. We will use a very simple watermark sim-
ilar to the one suggested by Koh and Chen [12], but ours
will be robust against re-ordering of drawing elements.
We assume that every drawing primitive is associated with
one or more points in the plane, such as
• the end-points of a line,
• the centre of a circle,
• the vertices of a polygon,
• etc.
and consider each point vj individually.
We will assume that all points lie in the first quadrant of
the Cartesian plane, that is, that the origin is at the bottom-
left of the drawing space. We associate a point vj with a
bin bτ(vj) by dividing the drawing space into n sectors
using n radial lines emanating from the origin at equally-
spaced angles. That is, let (r(vj ), θ(vj)) denote the polar








Let wi = wi1, . . . , w
i
n denote the watermark of author i,
where each wij is drawn from a standard normal distribu-
tion. We compute the watermarked version v̂j of a point
vj by




for some agreed global scaling parameter α. That is, the
point is moved further away from or closer to the origin
by an amount proportional to wi
τ(vj)
.
As for the general layered watermark, the watermark
resulting from a collection of collaborating authors is a
segmented watermark and can be detected by breaking
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the instruction stream into the streams contributed by each
author. However, it is possible, and more convenient, to
detect the individual watermark as if the object contained
a composite watermark as in the layered example. This
can be done for a watermark wi using the correlation of
the points’ distances from the origin
r = r(v1), r(v2), . . . r(vt)
with the vector of corresponding watermark components
w̃i = wiτ(v1), w
i
τ(v2)
, . . . , wiτ(vt).
If the correlation is high, we report that the watermark is
present, otherwise we report that it is not.
4 Fingerprinting
For simplicity, in this section we will assume that proof-
of-ownership is not an issue. Suppose, for example, that
the authors are employees of a company and do not own
the intellectual property in their work. However, leaking
a copy of their work prior to the official company publi-
cation may compromise the company’s intellectual prop-
erty, and the company might be interested in learning who
made the leak.
In the watermarking solution to this problem, each le-
gitimate copy of the object is embedded with a distinct
watermark, called a fingerprint, that identifies the owner
of that copy. If one of the legitimate owners makes an il-
legitimate copy, and this copy is found by investigators,
this copy can be traced to the owner using the fingerprint
in it.
As in the proof-of-ownership case, it is easy to see that
a dishonest insider in possession of the unwatermarked
original can circumvent the tracing protocol. In this sec-
tion, we will consider how the architectures described in
Section 3 can be adapted to solve the fingerprinting prob-
lem in the presence of dishonest insiders.
In order to implement fingerprinting, there are two
basic changes that need to be made to the proof-of-
ownership systems described in the previous sections:
• watermarks (i.e. fingerprints) are not known by the
owner of that watermark; and
• each author should have a distinct (fingerprinted)
version of the object.
In general, fingerprints may be chosen to have various
useful properties such as collusion security. For simplicity
and due to space considerations, we will not consider such
properties here. We require only that each author receives
a version of the work containing a distinct watermark.
4.1 With a Server
Implementing fingerprinting is straightforward using a
server. The server simply chooses a distinct watermark
wi for each author i known only to the server, and embeds
wi (only) into any objects that are transmitted to author i.
If author i leaks a copy of the object, the author can be
traced by the presence of wi in the leaked copy.
4.2 Without a Server
Without a server, it is necessary for every author i to
choose a distinct fingerprint wi,j for every co-author j.
When making a change to the object, author i must gen-
erate a version of the change for each fingerprint wi,j
and transmit this version to author j over a private chan-
nel instead of using the broadcast channel as before. In
this way, each author i has a copy of the object contain-
ing a collection of m− 1 fingerprints w1,i, w2,i, . . . , etc.,
uniquely identifying that author’s copy. Assuming that
the watermark in use is separable, any author j who leaks
a copy can be traced by the presence in the leaked copy of
any one of wi,j for some other author i.
Since each fingerprint wi,j is known by author i, it may
be possible for author i to attempt to frame author j by
leaking a copy of the object containing wi,j . A simple so-
lution would be to use majority voting in the tracing algo-
rithm, and require that the majority of fingerprints found
in a leaked copy correspond to the accused author. Since a
dishonest author i’s object also contains the m− 1 finger-
prints assigned to i by the other authors, this test would
correctly identify i as the leaker. However, it is still pos-
sible for a majority of authors acting in collusion to frame
an author in the minority.
A more robust, but more complicated, solution is to use
asymmetric fingerprinting [15] (also known as a buyer-
seller protocol [14]). In these protocols, the fingerprinter
(author i in the above) and the fingerprintee (author j) in-
teract during the fingerprinting process in such a way that
the fingerprinter cannot obtain a copy of the fingerprinted
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object. Every time author i makes a change to the object,
he or or she must execute the asymmetric fingerprinting
protocol with every other author j, using fingerprint wi,j .
5 Discussion
5.1 Security
Our systems permit authors to access only watermarked
versions of the object they are working on, and hence an
insider wishing to deny the contribution of the other au-
thors, or leak an illegitimate copy of the object, would
ideally be in the same position as an outsider attempting
to do the same. The systems described above do not quite
meet this ideal, since
• insiders see many different objects (being different
versions of the object-in-progress) containing the
same watermark, potentially giving insiders greater
opportunity for attacks that attempt to estimate the
watermark; and
• insiders generally know the source of any change,
and therefore which pixels or instructions are water-
marked by which author, and can use this knowledge
to target a particular watermark.
Of course, if the watermark being used was perfectly se-
cure (in the sense that it is unremovable without unaccept-
ably degrading the object), this extra knowledge should
not matter, but on current watermarking technology, this
seems a little optimistic.
5.2 Collusions
A group of dishonest insiders may pool their information
in an attempt to defeat the watermarks of insiders from
outside the colluding group. This sort of attack is com-
monly considered in fingerprinting systems, where the
colluders are a collection of outsiders. Here, such col-
luders may be insiders as well, but as we have observed in
the previous section, inside colluders are in the same po-
sition as outside colluders since the insiders have access
only to a fingerprinted version of the object. Hence we ex-
pect that fingerprinting algorithms that are secure against
outsider collusions should also be secure against insider
collusions.
In the proof-of-ownership case, all authors have exactly
the same information about the original object and about
other authors’ watermarks (which, ideally, is no informa-
tion at all). Hence a collusion will not reveal any informa-
tion to the colluders other than the colluders’ own water-
marks, and what they already knew by virtue of their be-
ing insiders. Since all the watermarks are independently
chosen and embedded, the colluders have not improved
their chances of defeating the non-colluders’ watermarks
over an insider acting alone.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced the problem of protecting the in-
tellectual property rights of multimedia content owners
where potentially malicious insiders have access to the
content before publication. Conventional watermarking
solutions to the proof-of-ownership problem cannot re-
solve intellectual property disputes that arise prior to pub-
lication, and conventional fingerprinting solutions cannot
trace leakers who leak pre-publication versions of con-
tent, since the adversary in such situations has access to
an unwatermarked version of the content.
We have proposed several possible architectures for
watermarking with dishonest insiders, in which insiders
have access only to a watermarked version of the object
that they are working on. Hence, an insider is in not much
better a position to defeat the watermark than an outsider.
If watermarks had perfect security, insiders would not be
in a better position at all.
Our systems cannot be guaranteed to successfully re-
solve any particular intellectual property dispute in a col-
laborative environment, and we do not think that any cur-
rently known (or even foreseen) computer system can,
since
• computers cannot make artistic judgements on the
worth of any particular contribution;
• realistic authors will generally use out-of-band com-
munications such as face-to-face meetings to ex-
change ideas; and
• we cannot watermark the semantics of multimedia
content.
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However, the architectures proposed in this paper provide
a basis for the development of systems that can assist in
resolving intellectual property disputes between collabo-
rators by providing at least some evidence of what hap-
pened prior to publication, and we are hopeful that further
research can overcome at least some of the limitations we
have noted.
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